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Commentary & Reply
On ”Expanding the Rebalance: Confronting
China in Latin America”
Jonathan Bissell
This commentary is in response to Daniel Morgan's article “Expanding the Rebalance:
Confronting China in Latin America” published in the Autumn 2015 issue of
Parameters (vol. 45, no. 3).

C

olonel Daniel Morgan sheds much-needed light on the Western
hemisphere and the challenges posed by deep Chinese engagement throughout it in his recent “Expanding the Rebalance:
Confronting China in Latin America” article. He lays out strong evidence
demonstrating China’s massive expansion of engagement in the hemisphere over the last 15 years using the four traditional pillars of national
power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic. His proposal for
the Pacific Command and the Southern Command to work together to
mitigate and confront contemporary issues, be more transparent, and
work multi-laterally with diverse partners offers innovative solutions
that should be seriously considered by senior leaders and United States
policy-makers.
His call for the inclusion of China in the annual PANAMAX exercise goes too far, however. China’s interests in the Western hemisphere
appear to be economically driven, predominantly by its demand for
extractable resources. As China’s growth wanes, the demand for these
commodities shrinks, adversely effecting the economic growth of several
Latin American countries whose populist leaders depend heavily upon
Chinese mineral consumption to satisfy their domestic social spending
promises. With the source of this revenue drying up, Latin American
leaders who exploited this commodity boom (while failing to diversify
their economies) are feeling political adversity during national elections. The recent change in the mood of the electorates in Argentina,
Guatemala, and Venezuela reflect voter frustrations with corruption
and poor economic choices. The complex, multi-lateral engagements of
many governments in the global south anchored around unsustainable
Chinese investments seem to be imploding.
The so-called South-South institutions (i.e. Bolivarian Alliance
for the Peoples of Our America, Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States, MERCOSUR, and Union of South American Nations)
have proven to be far less effective than the framework of intergovernmental institutions (IGOs) the United States set up following World
War II, such as the United Nations (UN) and the other regimes from
the Bretton Woods Accords. As China increases its power on the world
stage, it relies on these US-formed IGOs to build its global credibility. It does so by selectively participating in various regimes, such as
UN peacekeeping missions. China’s recent deployment of the Chinese
hospital ship, the Peace Ark, is reminiscent of the US’s effective use of
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its own USS Comfort and USS Mercy hospital ships as instruments of
smart-power. However, its use of the UN Convention of the Law of the
Sea Treaty to validate the expansion of its maritime boundaries in the
South China Sea, via an existing UN-sponsored, multi-lateral treaty is
legally questionable at best. China struggles to adhere to other international laws; its human rights and property rights enforcements remain
dubious. By permitting the Chinese to participate in PANAMAX, the
United States would be lending this autocratic regime tacit credence
to our hemispheric neighbors, clearly not part of the strategic vision
Washington endorses under its liberal world-order goals. China seems
to play by international rules and norms merely when it profits itself.
The ways and means to achieve China’s strategic ends primarily benefit
China, at varying costs to everyone else in the international system
The recent elections of the political opposition in Argentina,
Guatemala, and Venezuela demonstrate voter displeasure with endemic
corruption. Latin American leaders under increasing levels of public
scrutiny may be less prone to accept the “kick-backs” that go along
with large defense acquisitions, unscrupulous economic agreements,
and additional quid pro quo activities from other less-than-transparent
states such as China. This could potentially open these markets to
the United States once again, improving both hemispheric economic
collaboration and security cooperation efforts. Additionally, the transparency provided by the adaptation of the Trans Pacific Partnership,
the continued US engagement through forums such as the Financial
Action Task Force, and the cross-COCOM cooperation as suggested by
Colonel Morgan should be considered as key tools to addressing Chinese
influence in Latin America.
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